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Abstract 
Federalism disputes arising from state regulations, particularly those pursuing health, safety, 
and  environmental goals, are a common feature of the U.S. political system.  Discussion of bases for 
settling such  disputes often focuses on the in- and out-state incidence of benefits and costs but inci-
dence is a complex concept that has not been systematically analyzed.  We discuss five factors impor-
tant to evaluating incidence and  present spillover criteria for judging disputes based on them.  When 
applied to  a Massachusetts regulation of daminozide residues in heat-processed apple products, the 
criteria reach different conclusions on its appropriateness, although the main criteria suggest it should 
be invalidated by the courts or preempted by federal  law.  The application illustrates how the spill-
over criteria can clarify analysis of federalism disputes. ECONOMIC CRITERIA FOR SETTLING FEDERALISM DISPUTES 
WITH AN  APPLICATION TO FOOD SAFETY REGULATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Periods of deregulation or lack of action by  the federal  government, such as  the 1980s, 
encourage the states to pass laws  that have the potential of burdening interstate commerce or con-
flicting with or impinging on federal  law.  This situation and  many others give rise to  federalism 
disputes where the validity of particular state laws  and  regulations is  challenged in the courts or in the 
writing of new federal  laws that seek to preempt or limit state action.  In the courts, an extensive 
body of case law has developed around federalism disputes but the standards for judging them retain a 
fuzziness,  or indeterminateness, especially where a state law's purpose is protection of health, wel-
fare,  or the environment and  federal  law  is  not explicitly preemptive.  Economic analyses of federal-
state regulatory disputes emphasize judging state laws based on the size and  incidence (in- versus out-
state) of externalities, benefits, and  costs associated with the regulated activity and the regulation 
itself.  A fuzziness  intrudes here as  well,  as  there is  no  consensus on the appropriate formulas for 
operationalizing incidence. 
Our purpose is to contribute to  the analysis of federal-state regulatory relationships by system-
atically presenting economic criteria for judging federalism disputes.  The criteria are based on meas-
ures of the incidence of in- versus out-state benefits and  costs, and may be characterized as  spillover 
criteria.  They have at least two major applications for formalizing the analysis of federalism disputes: 
as  an input to court cases and  to  Congressional discussion of the merits of preempting state regula-
tion.  We begin with background on legal  and economic analyses of federalism disputes; present the 
economic criteria; and then apply them to food  safety regulation, in  particular to the case of state 
regulation of Alar residues in heat-processed apple products. 
1 LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES OF FEDERALISM DISPUTES 
A large body of case law and  legal literature addresses federalism disputes.  State laws can be 
invalidated under either the commerce or supremacy clauses of the U.S. Constitution.  The legal dis-
cussion focuses on standards for judging whether state laws pose undue burdens on interstate com-
merce and thus should be invalidated, or federal  law preempts state regulations based on its explicit 
language or implicit intent.  Here we discuss examples of case law related to food  products.  The 
economic literature on federalism disputes is  more limited and  focuses on the development of eco-
nomic criteria for judging whether invalidation or preemption is appropriate in specific cases. 
The U.S. political system contains an  inherent tension between federal power and  states' 
rights.  It requires continuous balancing of the federal government's interest in maintaining an unhin-
dered national market and  in regulating interstate commerce,  with the states' interest in legislating to 
meet the needs of their separate constituencies.  All  recognize that state regulation may  have advan-
tages over federal  regulation.  As  smaller units, states may  meet the needs of consumers more 
closely, be more flexible in  making necessary changes, experiment more successfully with solutions to 
problems, and be more efficient in  administering and  enforcing regulatory programs.  However, state 
regulation may also have disadvantages including costs associated with fragmenting the national mar-
ket and the possibility it may be rent seeking in nature, erecting barriers to trade in order to benefit 
in-state interests.  For food products, state regulation may be undesirable if states' ability to develop 
appropriate standards and enforcement strategies is limited or if different sets of standards confuse 
consumers about products' healthfulness and safety. 
Invalidation of  State Regulation Under the Commerce  Clause 
The commerce clause is relied on in court challenges of state and  local laws in  areas where 
Congress has not acted.  The federal courts' protection of interstate commerce is based on three 
beliefs:  "national economic welfare is maximized by free trade among the states; states frequently 
2 perceive their best interests to  lie in erection of barriers to free trade in some commodities or by some 
means;  and Congress' agenda is too crowded to  rely on it as the sole source of limitations on state 
barriers to  interstate commerce (pierce, 1985:  p. 614). "I  According to a thorougb analysis by 
Pierce (1985),  commerce clause cases can be divided into three major categories:  those involving 
state regulation that places burdens on the free flow of interstate commerce; those were the state has 
erected barriers to  protect its own economic interests; and  those involving state regulations that favor 
health, safety and environmental goals but may thus burden interstate commerce.  Our focus is on the 
latter type of cases.  Many recent federalism disputes heard in the courts involve these cases because 
the states have an  increased interest in these areas and any state action is  likely to have some effect on 
interstate commerce. 
Over the years, the courts have developed tests to  balance federal  and  state interests in such 
cases.  One influential statement of this test was announced in Pike v.  Bruce Church,  Inc. , 397 U.S. 
137,  142 (1970): "Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to  effectuate a legitimate local public 
interest, and effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden 
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."  The 
necessary balancing has resulted in recurrent conflict for the courts.  As Foote notes,  "The Supreme 
Court has developed a relatively indeterminate balancing test, upholding state regulation that affects 
interstate commerce if the regulation is rationally related to  a legitimate state interest and if the state 
interest in regulation outweighs the burden imposed on commerce (Foote,  1985:  p.  118)."  The 
indeterminateness of the balancing test fundamentally stems from the second part of the formula--the 
balancing of the legitimate state interest against the burden imposed on commerce.  How is this 
tradeoff to be measured? 
IThis area of law is  commonly referred to as dormant commerce clause jurisprudence since 
"the language of the Constitution does not explicitly refer to  state interference with interstate com-
merce.  It was only by interpreting the document's silence that courts could ascertain the states' role 
in regulating commerce (Foote,  1985:  pp.  117-18)." 
3 Two cases involving food  products highlight the difficulties.  In the first, American Can  Co. 
v.  Oregon Liquor Control Commission,  15  Or. App. 618, 517 P:2d 691  (1973), an  Oregon statute 
requiring soft drinks to  be sold in  reusable containers was challenged.  The statute was based on the 
state's environmental interests, such  as  reduced environmental harm due to reduced litter.  The Ore-
gon  law  burdened interstate trade by  introducing the need for different distribution systems throughout 
the country.  The state appellate court found,  however, that the imposed burden was not substantial 
enough to  invalidate the statute (pierce,  1985).  The court also validated the law because it was 
reluctant to compare incomparables,  in  this case the national economic interest in a uniform market 
versus state environmental concerns. 
In  the second case, Hunt v.  Washington Apple Advertising Commission,  432 U.S. 333 (1977), 
the state of North Carolina had prohibited the use on labels of any grading system for apples other 
than the one provided by the United States Department of Agriculture.  North Carolina argued that 
the presence of multiple grading systems could cause confusion and harm to consumers.  The main 
negative impact of the law appeared to be on Washington state apple growers who argued they had 
developed a superior grading system, which allowed greater marketability of their products (Farber, 
1986).  North Carolina's statute favored  apple growers in states with no grading system of their own, 
including North Carolina growers, at the expense of states with advanced grading systems (Smith, 
1986).  The Supreme Court balanced the protectionist effect against the purported consumer benefits, 
finding that the pattern of the statute's burdens and benefits was sufficient to  indicate discrimination 
and  inval idate the state law. 
Balancing federal  and  state interests is difficult, with many factors entering into courts' deci-
sions.  The task is made more difficult by a lack of clarity in operationalizing measures of a law's in-
versus out-state effects.  Is the absolute size of the in- and out-state benefits and  costs the key issue? 
Or is  it the ratio of in- and  out-state benefits and costs?  To date, these issues are not decided or 
y tematically analyzed. 
4 Invalidation of  State Regulation Under the Supremacy Clause 
The supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution is employed to challenge state actions in  areas 
where Congress has acted.  In such cases, the state often argues it is  supplementing federal  regulation 
in order to increase protection of its citizens.  Congress has the power to block any form of state 
regulation and the courts will find  such a result where Congress has made explicit its  intent to  pre-
empt.  Frequently, however, Congress has not been explicit leaving the courts to judge whether it 
implicitly intended to preempt.  These later cases fall  into three categories:  where there is  a direct 
conflict between state and federal  law;  where state law frustrates the purpose of a federal  scheme or 
poses an obstacle to accomplishment of Congressional goals; and  where Congress intended to occupy 
a field, leaving no  room for state action. 
On their face,  preemption cases do  not involve the same type of balancing of interests 
required in commerce clause cases.  The courts engage in  analysis of conflict between laws (e.g., is  it 
possible to comply simultaneously with the federal  and state law); whether state law obstructs Con-
gressional goals; and of Congressional intent.  However, the balancing of in- versus out-state effects 
is  inherent to the judging of any federalism dispute.  For example, the degree to which a state law 
frustrates a federal purpose depends in part on the scope and  incidence of its impacts.  In any case,  as 
Pierce concludes in his review of federalism disputes, preemption of state regulation by federal  law is 
not frequently exercised by the courts, and vague Congressional language gives "states considerable 
latitude to impose regulatory requirements in areas involving extensive federal regulation even when 
the state regulation conflicts with the goals of federal  regulation (pierce,  1985:  p.  631)."  Thus the 
main arena for resolving these federalism disputes is  in Congress, which can continually adjust the 
relationship between federal  and state law through its decisions whether to  include preemptive 
language in new legislation.  In making these adjustments, it must perform the same balancing of 
federal and state interests found  in commerce clause cases.  What guidance can economic criteria lend 
to these decisions? 
5 Economic AlUllyses of  Federalism Disputes 
Formal analyses of federalism disputes employing an explicit economic approach are relatively 
small  in  number,  including Rose-Ackerman (1981), Rice  (1985), Foote (1984), and Pierce (1985). 
Rose-Ackerman (1981) develops a model  of the tastes and  preferences of inhabitants of various states 
in  order to  measure regulatory spillover effects between states.  Political action allows citizens to 
support laws that enable their state to  "export costs but support laws that reduce the costs imposed on 
them (Rose-Ackerman,  1981:  p.  152)."  Such participation is only possible in a federal  system that 
leaves room for non-unitary regulations.  The status quo will differ in different states, which will 
impact individuals' views of national legislation and reveals the relative bargaining power of the 
people.  Rose-Ackerman's analysis suggests that federalism  matters in a political system where capital 
can move but inhabitants are relatively inflexible toward moving.  She suggests that state laws may 
spread to  other states for economic reasons rather than due to their usefulness.  In particular, state 
laws may be used to avoid economic costs at the expense of others, and  national laws (preemption) 
may be enacted in  order to control the size of spillovers and the costs of inconsistent laws. 
Rice (1985) draws similar conclusions from his analysis of differences in state laws governing 
product-related quality and  performance claims.  He employs the model  to  examine the economic 
reasons for a state law to spread to  other states.  Rice argues that states have a high degree of free-
dom to enact laws of their choice and that the costs of protective laws are not fully internalized within 
the enacting jurisdictions as  long as  less protective states exist.  Since most consumers do not fully 
relocate to  match their regulatory preferences with those of the state they reside in,  and  "exit" is not 
totally effective in  any case since less protective states pay part of the cost of the more protective 
states, differing state laws result in  income redistribution.  Legislatures of less protective states will be 
inclined toward passing more protective laws in order to  avoid negative spillovers into their states and 
to  encourage positive spill-ins from the remaining less protective jurisdictions.  This results in an 
increasing number of states exporting costs to  a decreasing number of lagging jurisdictions, magnify-
6 ing the overcharge in less protective jurisdictions.  The long-run outcome is resemblance among state 
laws.  Rice argues this equilibrium is  not necessarily optimal and may differ significantly from  regu-
latory preferences that would have been mirrored in  a federal  system.  The federal  government and 
the courts have roles to play in  controlling this phenomenon. 
Foote's analysis of federalism disputes takes a separate but related tack (Foote,  1984).  She 
notes that the degree of conflict between state and  federal  regulation of health and safety has increased 
since the 1960s as  the federal  government increased its regulatory activity in this area.  To analyze 
this conflict, Foote classifies state regulations into five stages based on where their impact is felt and 
argues that each class has a likely pattern of benefits and costs that should dictate whether preemption 
of state law is  appropriate.  The first stage, product standards, involves the federal  interest in safety 
and  health and  in unhindered interstate trade through uniform national standards.  The federal  interest 
in  a uniform market usually exceeds the states' interest in  improved health and safety standards for 
products, with preemption of state laws being the frequent consequence.  The second stage, produc-
tion, involves the national interest in health and environmental standards and site specific workplace 
and community issues.  Foote argues that economies of scale in decision making and  interstate com-
petition call for federal  regulation of production but state laws do  not necessarily undermine federal 
regulation, especially when their effects are completely in-state.  The third stage, the process of 
exchange, requires product information.  Preemption of state law is justified in cases where producers 
cannot realize economies of scale without preemption, e.g. where information is to appear on the 
product package, but not for other information that may be provided separately.  State regulation of 
the fourth stage, conditions of sale and point-of-sale services, usually has only in-state impacts and 
preemption is  not justified.  The same is true for stage five,  conditions of use,  as  long as the regu-
lations do not undermine federal safety requirements. 
The Rose-Ackerman, Rice,  and Foote models present useful insights into the probable 
incidence of the benefits and costs of state regulations.  However, the next step, measurement of 
7 incidence,  is  not undertaken and  remains undefined.  Pierce attempts this measurement with his model 
of geographical spillovers (1985:  pp. 646-654).  In  evaluating a state regulation the model focuses on 
the degree to  which  it is  evenhanded or the law's relative impact on in- and  out-state interests.  The 
theory is  that "the state's political process will  produce a reasonable balance of regulatory benefits and 
burdens from a national perspective if,  but only if,  there is at least a rough equivalence between the 
proportion of total benefits that accrue to  in-state interests and  the proportion of total burdens that are 
imposed on in-state interests (pierce,  1985:  p.  647)."  Pierce summarizes his spillover criteria as: 
States should be allowed to make regulatory decisions with no  geographic spillover (or 
with negative spillover equal  in percentage to  positive spillover), but they should not 
be allowed to make regulatory decisions with either positive or negative geographic 
spillover (or, more accurately, with disproportionate positive or negative spillover) 
(pierce,  1985:  p.  653). 
Pierce's model  is  a base for the criteria for settling federalism disputes presented here. 
Legal and economic analyses of federalism disputes include a range of considerations.  Key 
among them is the degree to  which the impacts of state regulation spill over to  other states.  Too 
much spillover is  almost uniformly deemed to  be legitimate grounds for blocking state regulation, 
either through invalidation under the commerce clause or preemption under federal law.  The diffi-
culty arises in  quantifying how much is too much,  which the literature does not systematically 
address. 
SPILWVER CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING STATE REGULATION 
We develop spillover criteria, inspired by Pierce's work, for assessing the incidence of the 
benefits and costs of a state regulation.  The model focuses on the short run where a state regulation 
has  gone into effect but no  new regulatory response has been made by other states or the federal 
government.  (Analysis of longer term impacts involves adding terms reflecting further regulatory 
8 adjustments.)  The short-run benefits of a state regulation can be expressed as: 
2  n 
SB  =  ~  ~  sb··  L..J  L..J  Il' 
;=1  j=1 
where sbij are the benefits accruing to  a particular interest group j G  = 1, ... ,n) and  the i subscript 
indicates whether the group is  in-state (i=l) or out-state (i=2).  The total short-run in-state benefits 
are: 
n 
SB I  = L sblj" 
j=1 
Total short-run out-state spillover benefits are: 
Short-run total costs can be expressed as: 
n 
SB2  =  Lsb2j" 
j=1 
2  n 
SC = ~~sc  ..  L..J L..J  Il' 
;=1  j=1 
with short-run in-state costs expressed as  SCI  and out-state spillover costs as  SC2.  This model  is 
flexible in analyzing the benefits and costs arising from state regulation since net benefits (benefits 
minus costs) can be determined for interest groups, states, or nationwide. 
Factors Important to Spillover Criteria 
The incidence of in- and out-state benefits and  costs may  be judged on several dimensions, 
each of which has validity and  should not be confused with the others.  We describe these dimensions 
as factors and assess the federalism criteria based on their ability to  reflect these factors.  All  meas-
ures are stated in dollar terms.  The five factors (see Table 1)  are: 
Factor 1:  Absolute Size of Out-State Benefits and  Costs.  The first important factor  is the 
absolute size of out-state spillovers, S~  and  S~. Absolute size is  compared to a specified value D. 
9 Table 1.  Factors Important to Spillover Criteria 
I 
Factor I 
Description  I 
Formulas  I 
1  Absolute Size of Out-State  SB2 
>  D  S~ >  D  Benefits and  Costs  <  < 
2 
Relative Size of Out-State  SB2 
> 
S~ 




<  < 
3 
Out-State Share of Total  SB2  >  F 
S~ >  F  Benefits and  Costs  SB  <  SC  < 
4  Absolute Size of In- Versus  SB I 
>  SB2  SCI  > 
S~  Out-State Benefits and  Costs  <  < 
5 
Relative Size of In- Versus  SB I  >  SB2 
Out-State Benefit/Cost Ratios  SCI  <  S~ 
Factor 2:  Relative Size of Out-State Benefits and  Costs.  The second factor compares the 
absolute size of spillover benefits and costs.  It may  be expressed based on the size of S~  compared 
to  S~  or as  an out-state benefit/cost-ratio that exceeds,  equals, or is less than a specified value E. 
Factor 3:  Out-State Share of Total Benefits and  Costs.  The third factor is the shares of a 
regulation's total benefits and  costs that spill over to  other states.  These shares are compared to a 
specified value F. 
Factor 4:  Absolute Size of In- Versus Out-State Benefits and  Costs.  The fourth factor com-
pares the absolute size of in- and out-state benefits (SBI versus S130  and  in- and out-state costs (SCI 
versus SC:z). 
Factor 5:  Relative Size of In- Versus Out-State Benefit/Cost Ratios.  The final  factor meas-
ures the relative size of the in-state benefit/cost ratio compared to  the out-state ratio. 
10 Alternative Criteria 
Several alternative criteria are suggested by the literature on federalism disputes and others 
are developed here.  To be useful, each criterion should address one or more of the above factors. 
The criteria are stated in mathematical form;  described in terms of their meaning and  relevance to  a 
state regulation; and assessed on their factor coverage.2  The seven criteria (see Table 2) are: 
Criterion 1:  No Spillover.  Criterion 1 judges the appropriateness of a state regulation based 
on whether there are any out-state spillover effects and  is thus a zero spillover criterion.  It may be 
alternatively described as:  S~  =  S~  =  0 or SBI =  SB  and  SCI  =  SC.  The major advantage of 
this criterion is the avoidance of any out-state effects from  a state regulation.  Its main disadvantage is 
its absolute rigidity.  Hardly any regulation would meet this criterion implying that all  regulation 
would be at the federal level. 
The criterion provides coverage of the first three factors.  Factor 1 is addressed since out-state 
benefits and costs are measured in  absolute values and restricted to  equal.zero.  Factor 2 also  is 
covered because both out-state benefits and  costs are constrained to  equal zero.  Factor 3 is  addressed 
because the criterion constrains the out-state share of benefits and  costs to be zero.  Factor 4 is  not 
addressed since the criterion does not constrain the absolute size of in- versus out-state benefits and 
costs.  Factor 5 is  not covered because the criterion does not address in- versus out-state benefit/cost 
ratios.  The in-state ratio could be greater than, equal to, or less than the out-state ratio, which in 
effect is undefined since out-state effects are constrained to zero. 
Criterion 2:  Maximum Absolute Spillover.  Criterion 2 requires that the absolute size of the 
spillovers be less than a specified value G (S~ ~ G and  S~  ~ G).  The criterion's advantage is  in 
2The criteria are economic in being based on the comparison of benefits and costs.  They are 
the product of regulatory practice in the United States.  As  such, they do  not bear any close resem-
blance to formal,  normative economic welfare criteria such as  pareto optimality.  For example, Cri-
teria 3 and 4 (see below), require that out-state benefits be greater than out-state costs.  While this 
suggests that out-staters as a group are made better off by the regulation, it does not address changes 
in individual welfare.  Furthermore, the criteria do not focus on the overall (in- and  out-state) benefit 
and cost profile of a state regulation. 
11 Table 2.  Spillover Criteria for the Benefits and  Costs of a State Regulation 
Factor Coveragea 
Criterion  Description  Formulas  1  2  3  4  5 
1  No Spillover  S~  = S~  = 0 
SBI = SB  Y  Y  Y  N  N 
SCI  = SC 
2  Maximum Absolute  S~  ~ G  Y  N  N  N  N  Spillover  S~  ~ G 
3  Net Positive  S~  > S~  N  Y  N  N  N  Spillover 
4  No Net Negative  S~  ~ S~  N  Y  N  N  N  Spillover 
5  Equal Spillover  SBI/SB = SCI/SC 
S~/SB = S~/SC 
SBI/SCI = SB/SC  N  Y  N  N  Y 
S~/S~ = SB/SC 
SBI/SCI = S~/S~ 
6  No Disproportionate  SBI/SB = SCI/SC ± H 
Spillover  S~/SB = S~/SC ± H 
SBI/SCI = SB/SC ± H  N  Y  N  N  Y 
S~/S~ = SB/SC ± H 
SBI/SCI = S~/S~ ± H 
7  Maximum Spillover  S~/SB ~ K  N  N  Y  Y  N  Share  S~/SC ~  K 
ay = yes, N = no. 
limiting the absolute size of spillovers.  Its disadvantages are it does not give any sense of the relative 
size of in- versus out-state benefits and  costs, and defining the G value may be difficult in practice. 
Only Factor 1 is  captured by Criterion 2 in  its constraint on the absolute size of the spillovers.  The 
other factors, which are value comparisons, are not captured. 
Criterion 3:  Net Positive Spillover.  Criterion 3 requires that a state regulation have a net 
po  itive spillover, e.g., that out-state benefits be greater than out-state costs,  S~ > Sc;..  Its main 
12 advantage is the prevention of negative or zero net spillovers.  Its drawbacks are it does not place a 
constraint on the absolute size of out-state benefits or costs and does not treat positive and  negative 
spillovers symmetrically.  It allows for large positive spillovers of benefits, which are still spillovers, 
but would disallow state regulations with any negative spillover, no  matter how small. 
Of the five factors,  only the second is  covered by Criterion 3, with out-state benefits 
restricted to exceed out-state costs,  S~ > S~ .  Using the second formula for Factor 2, this criterion 
restricts the out-state benefit/cost ratio to be greater than one, so that the specified value of E is  1. 
Factors  1 and  3 are not covered by  Criterion 3 since it is not concerned with the absolute size of the 
spillovers or the share of out-state to total benefits and  costs.  Nor are factors 4 and 5 covered since 
there is  no  comparison of in- and out-state benefits and costs. 
Criterion 4:  No  Net Negative Spillover.  Criterion 4 is a non-negativity criterion requiring 
avoidance of a net negative spillover.  It relaxes Criterion 3 by allowing zero net benefits and  in-
cludes Criterion 1 as  a special case where S~ = S~  = O.  Its advantage is  the avoidance of net 
negative spillovers.  Its disadvantages and factor coverage mirror those of Criterion 3. 
Criterion 5:  Equal Spillover.  Criterion 5 requires equal spillover of the benefits and costs of 
a state regulation and is based on Pierce's work (1985).  There are several alternative ways to state 
this criterion.  It equates the ratio of in-state benefits to total benefits to  the ratio of in-state costs to 
total costs (SB)/SB = SC)/SC) and,  similarly, for out-state benefits and costs  (S~/SB = S~/SC). 
It can also be stated in terms of equating in- and out-state benefit/cost ratios to  the total benefit/cost 
ratio (SB)/SC)  = SB/SC,  S~/S~ = SB/SC) or as setting the in-state benefit/cost ratio equal to the 
out-state ratio (SB)/SC)  =  S~/S~. 
An advantage of Criterion 5 is the avoidance of an  unequal export of benefits and  costs to 
other states, which presumably occurs most often in  cases where the exported costs outweigh the 
benefits, although the reverse scenario is also possible.  As  Pierce (1985) notes, this affords out-state 
interests the same protection against passage of unreasonable laws as  is  enjoyed by  in-state parties, 
13 since both will experience the same benefit/cost ratio.  The criterion also has the advantage of sym-
metrical treatment of spillover benefits and  costs.  It has three disadvantages.  One,  it imposes no 
constraints on the relative size of in- and out-state benefits and  costs.  Hypothetically, all  of the 
benefits and  costs could be exported and still meet this criterion.  Second, the criterion places no 
constraints on the absolute size of the spillovers.  Finally, Criterion 5 is  extremely rigid since it 
would be very rare that a state law would have exactly equal spillover. 
Criterion 5 captures two of the five factors.  Factor 2 is  addressed as  it requires that the out-
state benefit/cost ratio equal the total ratio  (S~/Sc; = SB/SC, so that E = SB/SC).  Factor 5 is 
addressed as  Criterion 5 restricts the in-state benefit/cost ratio to  equal the out-state ratio.  The 
criterion does not address the absolute size of spillovers (Factor 1), the share of benefits and  costs 
exported (Factor 3), or the relative size of in- versus out-state benefits and  costs (Factor 4). 
Criterion 6:  No  Disproportionate Spillover.  Criterion 6 relaxes Criterion 5 by requiring that 
there be no  disproportionate spillover.  This is  accomplished by adding an  adjustment factor, H, to 
the formulas yielding the alternative expressions:  SB1/SB  = SC1/SC  ± H;  S~/SB = Sc;/SC ± H; 
SB1/SC1 = SB/SC ± H;  S~/Sc; = SB/SC ± H;  and SB1/SC1 = S~/Sc; ± H.  The major 
advantage of Criterion 6 is that disproportionate spillovers are avoided,  yielding a more flexible and 
useful standard than is  provided by Criterion 5.  Its disadvantages mirror those of Criterion 5 except 
for its rigidity, with the addition that with Criterion 6 it may be difficult in practice to define H. 
Factors 2 and 5 are captured by  Criterion 6.  Factor 2 is  addressed as  the criterion requires 
the out-state benefit/cost ratio be equal to the total ratio plus an  adjustment factor of H,  (S~/Sc; = 
SB/SC ± H).  Factor 5 is  also covered as  in- and out-state benefit/cost ratios are equated, again with 
an  adjustment factor of H (SB1/SC 1 = S~/Sc; ± H).  As  was the case with Criterion 5, the other 
three factors are not addressed. 
Criterion 7;  Maximum Spillover Share.  Criterion 7 constrains the share of the total benefits 
or costs of a state regulation that may be exported to a specified value K  (S~/SB ~ K, Sc;/SC  ~ 
14 K), which in most applications would presumably be set below .5 and  perhaps quite far below it.  The 
criterion's advantage is  in placing a proportional limit on the extent of in- versus out-state impacts. 
Its disadvantages are it places no  limit on the absolute or relative size of exported benefits and costs, 
or on the ratio of exported benefits to costs.  Also, the definition of K may be difficult in practice. 
Criterion 7 provides coverage of Factor 3 by  constraining the out-state share of benefits and 
costs.  It also addresses Factor 4 by constraining the absolute size of in- versus out-state benefits and 
costs, with the relationship depending on the definition of K.  For example,  if K is defined to  be less 
than .5, in-state will be restricted to  be greater than out-state benefits (SB1 >  SBV and in-state to  be 
greater than out-state costs.  None of the remaining three factors are addressed by Criterion 7. 
Criteria Summary.  The seven criteria formalize and  systematically relate dimensions of spill-
overs from state regulations that may be important in settling federalism disputes.  Each criterion's 
usefulness should be judged on its coverage of the five factors  important to spillover criteria.  The 
ideal result might be a single criterion that supplies complete factor coverage.  As  Table 2 shows, 
none of the criteria fulfills this condition making use of a combination of two or more necessary for 
full factor coverage.  Only Criteria 1 and  2 address Factor 1 providing a sense of the absolute size of 
spillovers.  Criterion 1 might appear to  be more useful than Criterion 2 because it covers more fac-
tors but is not because its rigidity regarding spillovers means it would invariably rule out state regu-
lation.  Thus a combination of Criterion 2 with one or more other criteria is  most promising. 
Both Criteria 3 and 4 provide coverage of Factor 2 but their usefulness is limited by their 
ruling out of any state regulation with negative net spillover, even when such spillovers are small. 
Criteria 5 and 6 each provide coverage of Factors 2 and 5, with Criterion 5 being of limited useful-
ness due to  its requirement of exactly equal spillovers.  Criterion 7 is the only one other than Cri-
terion 1 that addresses Factor 3 and  is preferable to  it because of its flexibility.  It is  also the only 
criterion that addresses Factor 4.  Thus a combination of Criteria 2, 6, and 7 is  most useful in analyz-
ing federalism disputes, since it gives full  factor coverage with a minimum set of easily understood 
15 criteria.  However, it should be noted that this combination constitutes a fairly rigorous test of the 
appropriateness of a state regulation.  Some analysts may  prefer to use Criterion 4, since it allows the 
most latitude for state regulation.  For application, the criteria require the actual measurement or 
estimation of all  in- and  out-state benefits and  costs in monetary terms. 
APPLYING THE SPILWVER CRITERIA:  THE CASE OF ALAR RESIDUES 
The federalism dispute arising from  state regulation of daminozide (Alar
TII)3  residues in heat-
processed apple products is  explored here in  an  application of the spillover criteria.  Such state regu-
lations are often seen as  a burden on interstate commerce by producers, processors, and retailers who 
seek court invalidation or preemption by federal law.  The states, and  groups within states, often view 
such regulation as  a necessary tool to  address varying consumer needs.  Congress has legislated on 
pesticide residues but not explicitly preempted all  state action.  In the mid-1980s, the state of Massa-
chusetts introduced stricter daminozide residue standards for heat-processed apple products than those 
of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.4  In such cases, the courts and  Congress must deter-
mine how to settle the federalism dispute.  Spillover criteria are useful in analyzing just such situa-
tions. 
Case Background 
Alar is  a growth regulator that was primarily used by apple growers to prevent early drop of 
apples so that fruit stayed hanging on the tree to  ripen to  a crisp, red, fresh looking product (U.S. 
EPA, 1984).  In economic terms, Alar also helped to reduce picking costs because fewer pickers 
could harvest for a longer period of time, and  shelf life of the product was enhanced.  Because Alar is 
absorbed by the plant and  its fruit,  it cannot be washed off before consumption or during processing. 
3 Alar is  a registered trademark of the Uniroyal Inc., which was its sole producer. 
4New York and  Maine also sought to  set their own standards.  For purposes of this applica-
tion, we ignore their activities. 
16 Heat processing decomposes Alar into another, more toxic component UDMH (unsymmetrical 
dimethylhydrazine) (U.S. EPA,  1987a). 
Daminozide was originally registered in  1963 for use on apples, with the residue tolerance 
level set at 30 parts per million (ppm)  (U.S. EPA,  1985; van Ravenswaay and  Hoehn,  1991).  No 
residue level was set for UDMH.  In 1984, the EPA announced its  intent to conduct a new  risk 
assessment of daminozide and  UDMH, including review of animal studies done in  the  1970s.  As  a 
result, EPA classified daminozide, as  well  as  UDMH, as  probable human carcinogens (U.S. EPA, 
1985).  It also recommended to  its Scientific Advisory Panel that Alar be banned.  However, the 
panel found the evidence that daminozide is  carcinogenic to be inadequate and  EPA withdrew from  its 
intent to ban (U .S. EPA,  1986).  Instead, it established a lower residue tolerance level of 20 ppm and 
ordered Uniroyal to  conduct new tests on the degree of toxicity (U.S. EPA, 1986;  1987b). 
In February 1989, EPA announced that preliminary results from the new Uniroyal studies 
indicated the cancer risk posed by Alar was unacceptable (U.S. EPA, 1989a) and  EPA was  likely to 
seek cancellation of Alar's registration when the tests were complete (van Ravenswaay and Hoehn, 
1991).  Spring 1989 saw intense media scrutiny of Alar, with special attention to  residues in  child-
ren's food.  In fact,  the broad discussion of the Alar controversy in the printed press and on popular 
TV shows such as  60 Minutes throughout the late 1980s led to  an enormous increase in  consumer 
concern about eating apples and  apple products (van Ravenswaay and Hoehn, 1991).  In June 1989 
Uniroyal voluntarily halted sales of Alar and  in  October requested voluntary cancellation of the food-
use registrations of products containing daminozide, effectively removing Alar from the market. 
The Massachusetts Department of Public Health was not satisfied with EPA's actions regard-
ing Alar and its reduction of residue tolerance levels for apples from 30 to 20 ppm in  1986.  It felt 
this reduction would not provide sufficient incentives to  further reduce residue levels or have the 
effect of lowering dietary exposure, especially for infants and  children (U.S. EPA, 1987b).  In 1986, 
the state of Massachusetts instituted its own residue tolerances for daminozide in  heat-processed apple 
17 products (Massachusetts Department of Public Health,  1986), while not setting a standard for fresh 
apples in order to avoid a direct confrontation with EPA (Caswell,  1988).  Under the state standards, 
as  of October 1,  1986, the residue tolerance was  set at 5 ppm for heat-processed apple products and  1 
ppm for baby foods.  The residues were to decrease to  1 ppm in heat-processed products and  to  non-
detectable for baby foods by October 1,  1987 and to non-detectable in  all  heat-processed apple prod-
ucts by October 1,  1988. 
The Massachusetts regulation on Alar residues occurred during a period of great market 
uncertainty regarding Alar's ultimate fate.  Processors and  retailers found themselves in  a difficult 
situation, with many believing the national standard would likely change to that of Massachusetts in 
the near future.  The general climate of uncertainty, along with the Massachusetts action, led much of 
private industry to declare voluntary boycotts on Alar-treated apples and  apple products (Consumer 
Reports,  1989).  In other words, they voluntarily applied the Massachusetts standard outside Massa-
chusetts, pursuing a single, national, Alar-free product strategy.  This led to protection of the health 
of consumers outside the state and  possible higher costs and prices for Alar-free food  products.  In 
our estimates, we initially assume that the Massachusetts action was the deciding factor in  a national 
switch from Alar use to  no  use and that this impact occurred immediately in  1987.  This results in 
some overestimation of benefits and costs, a point we return to  in interpreting the sensitivity of the 
results.  Benefits and costs are calculated on a yearly basis with results presented for 1987.  Analysis 
of the size and incidence of the estimated benefits and costs of the Massachusetts regulation, devel-
oped in the next sections, contributes to settling this federalism dispute by quantifying the claims of 
the various involved parties. 
Bene.ftJs  Estimation:  Placing a Monetary Value on Chllnges in Health 
The major benefit expected from reducing Alar residues in heat-processed apple products is 
an  improvement in human health, either decreased morbidity or mortality.  Benefits measurement 
requires placing a monetary value on the health improvement.  We use two separate approaches to 
18 yield five benefit estimates.  The benefits are calculated per person and then estimated by state based 
on state population figures for 1987 by the U.S. Department of Commerce,  Bureau of Census Popula-
tion Division.  All calculations are reported in  1987 dollars. 
Approach 1.  The main measure used for improvement due to  reduction in exposure to  pes-
ticide residue risk is  a reduction in  excess cancer deaths.  Analysts state this risk as  additional lifetime 
risk of cancer death per a population (e.g., a 1  *10-6 risk translates to one more cancer death per 
million people over a lifetime exposure).  During the 1980s, EPA, some states, and  private groups 
issued risk assessments for Alar and UDMH.  Since our focus  is heat-processed apple products, we 
rely on the EPA's two published estimates during this period for the general population for risk 
associated with the break down product of daminozide, UDMH, in apple products.  EPA's 1985 risk 
estimate for UDMH in apple products was  1  *10-4 or an estimated 100 extra cancer deaths per million 
people with lifetime exposure.  EPA's 1989 estimate for UDMH in apple products is  1.4*10-5 or 14 
extra cancer deaths in  1 million people.5 
Several methods are in use for calculating the value of a human statistical life.  Fisher, Chest-
nut, and Violette (1989) argue the most credible measure of the value of reducing risk is the amount 
people are willing to pay for the risk reduction.  They discuss three major categories of willingness to 
pay estimation studies:  wage-risk studies, contingent valuation studies, and  consumer market studies. 
Fisher et al.'s review of these studies suggest a range of estimates for the value-per-statistical-life of 
$1.6 to $8.5 million in 1986 dollars and that this range is useful for evaluating policies expected to 
extend lives. 
50ther risk estimates generally fall  within this range, although risk estimates for all  food 
products and specific population groups, especially children under 1 year of age,  are higher (U.S. 
EPA, 1985;  1989a; 1989b).  The state of Massachusetts' published risk estimate was  120 extra cancer 
deaths per 1 million people for a 5 ppm residue level  in apple products, and  24 deaths for a 1 ppm 
tolerance level (Massachusetts Department of Public Health,  1986).  The Natural Resources Defense 
Council's estimate published in  1989 was 41  cancer deaths per 1 million people (Sewell  and Wbyatt, 
1989). 
19 A range of benefits for reducing exposure to residues is  estimated based on the Fisher et al. 
value of life and  EPA risk estimates.6  The low value of life is $1.6 million and the high value is 
$8.5 million, or $1,656,000 and  $8,797,500 in  1987 dollars.  The risk estimates for UDMH in apple 
products are the 1985 estimate of 1  *10-4 and the 1989 estimate of 1.4*10-5,  or 100*10-6 and  14*10-6, 
respectively.  These estimates are for a lifetime, which is  assumed to be 70 years.  Therefore the 
annual risk levels for the above estimates are 1.4*10-6 and 0.2*10-6 (Le.,  1.4 or 0.2 cancer deaths per 
million people per year).7  A range of dollar benefits per million people per year for avoidance of 
this risk is  calculated by multiplying the two value of life estimates by the two risk estimates: 
A)  $1,656,000 * 0.2 =  $331,200  (lower value of life * lower risk), 
B)  $8,797,500 * 0.2 = $1,759,500 (higher value of life * lower risk) , 
C)  $1,656,000 * 1.4 =  $2,318,400 (lower value of life * higher risk), 
D)  $8,797,500 * 1.4 = $12,316,500 (higher value of life * higher risk). 
These translate to  an  annual per capita willingness to  pay of $0.33, $1.76, $2.32, and $12.32.  The 
benefits based on this estimation are reported in columns 1, 3, 4, and 5 of rows 1-3, Table 3.  In-
state (Massachusetts) benefits range from a low of about $2 million to a high of $72 million, while 
out-state (all  other states) benefits range from $78 million to $3 billion. 
Approach 2.  In a consumer market study, van Ravenswaay and Hoehn (1991) measured 
changes in consumer behavior after the public became aware that Alar was a suspected carcinogen. 
They estimated consumers' implied willingness to pay for Alar-free apples and cancer risk reductions. 
Annual per capita willingness to  pay to  avoid Alar in processed apple products can be calculated 
based on these results without using value of life or EPA risk estimates.  Van Ravenswaay and Hoehn 
6Caution is required in extending the Fisher et al. value of life estimates to the case of Alar 
because the characteristics of the risks analyzed differ.  Fisher et al.  considered risks that are some-
what voluntary and familiar Gob-related risks, smoking, seat belt use), while the risk from premature 
death due to  Alar exposure is  involuntary and  unfamiliar to  consumers.  The risk perception literature 
suggests that individuals may  see and  value different types of risks differently. 
7Respectively,  100170  =  1.4 and  14170  =  0.2. 
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Table 3.  Summary of Estimated Benefits and  Costs of Massachusetts Regulation (In Dollars) 
Column  1  2  3 
Row  Benefit &  Cost Measures  $0.33a  $0.81b  $1.76c 
1  SBI  1,932,150  4,742,550  10,304,800 
2  S~  78,184,260  191,906,150  416,982,720 
3  SB  80,116,410  196,649,270  427,287,520 
4  SCI  (0.1 %)f  562,846  562,846  562,846 
5  SCI  (1.0%)g  626,233  626,233  626,233 
6  SCI  (10.0%)h  1,260,103  1,260,103  1,260,103 
7  S~ (0.1%)  33,276,554  33,276,554  33,276,554 
8  S~ (1.0%)  41,667,767  41,667,767  41,667,767 
9  S~ (10.0%)  125,579,897  125,579,897  125,579,897 
10  SC  (0.1 %)  33,839,400  33,839,400  33,839,400 
11  SC  (1.0%)  42,294,000  42,294,000  42,294,000 
12  SC  (10.0%)  126,840,000  126,840,000  126,840,000 
aFisher et al.  based estimate of willingness-to-pay at lower value of life and  lower risk. 
bvan  Ravenswaay and  Hoehn based estimate of willingness to pay. 
cFisher et al.  based estimate of willingness to pay at higher value of life and  lower risk. 
dFisher et al.  based estimate of willingness to pay at lower value of like and higher risk. 
eFisher et al.  based estimate of willingness to pay at higher value of life and  higher risk. 
fEstimate for a 0.1 % cost increase. 
&Estimate for a 1.0% cost increase. 
hEstimate for a 10.0% cost increase. 
4  5 
$2.32d  $12.32e 
13,583,600  72,133,600 
549,659,040  2,918,879,040 
563,242,640  2,991,012,640 
562,846  562,846 
626,233  626,233 
1,260,103  1,260,103 
33,276,554  33,276,554 
41,667,767  41,667,767 
125,579,897  125,579,897 
33,839,400  33,839,400 
42,294,000  42,294,000 
126,840,000  126,840,000 (1991) estimated that in  1987 consumers were willing to pay $1.31, or 17.4% of apple expenditures, 
per capita to  avoid  Alar in  apples.  To estimate willingness to  pay for Alar-free heat-processed apple 
products, we apply this percentage to  expenditures on these products.  Dollar value of shipments data 
for the relevant 7-digit Standard Industrial Classification products for the year 1982 are used as  a 
proxy for processed apple expenditures per capita since no  data are available on them.8  The 1982 
figures are used to  exclude the effects of sales losses that may have occurred in these products after 
1984 due to  publicity about risks associated with Alar.  The U.S. total value of shipments for pro-
cessed apple products in the relevant 7-digit SIC codes in  1982 was $781.1 million.9  The U.S. 
population for the same year was  231,995,000 (U .S. Department of Census, Bureau of the Census 
Population Division), resulting in  a per capita expenditure on processed apple products of $3.37 for 
1982, or $4.64 in  1987 dollars. to  Applying van Ravenswaay and Hoehn's willingness to pay esti-
mate of 17.4% of expenditures, we calculate a per capita willingness to pay of $0.81  per year to 
avoid Alar in  processed apple products.  Based on 1987 state populations, this yields calculated in-
state (Massachusetts) benefits of $4.7 million and  out-state (all  other states) benefits of $192 million 
(column 2 of rows  1-3, Table 3).  These figures fall  within the range generated by the first benefits 
estimation approach. 
Cost Estimation 
The costs of loss of Alar in apple production, processing, and distribution are calculated based 
8The relevant 7-digit products are:  SIC 2032111  canned baby foods,  fruits; SIC 2032171 
canned baby food, juices; SIC 2033112 canned fruits, apples; SIC 2033113 canned fruits, applesauce; 
SIC 2033161  canned fruit, pie mixes, apple; SIC 2033A11 canned fruit juices and  nectars, single 
strength:  apple juice; SIC 2034321  dried and dehydrated fruits:  apples; and SIC 2037155 frozen 
fruits:  apples and  applesauce (U.S. Department of Commerce,  1982 Census of Manufactures). 
9ne SIC data did not list a value of shipments for SIC 2032111, canned baby foods, fruits 
for 1982 because of disclosure problems.  This SIC  is  not included in the calculations. 
'Grhe consumer price index for apples for all  urban consumers was applied.  The value for 
July 1982 = 331.8 and July 1987 = 457.0, for a ratio of 457/331.8 = 1.377 (U.S. Department of 
Labor,  1982;  1987). 
22 on EPA and  our estimates.  The two major benefits of Alar use in  apple production are increased 
storage life and preharvest fruit drop prevention (U.S. EPA,  1985).  Other listed benefits are quality 
improvement effects such as  increased red color, delayed watercore, or bruise reduction.  EPA 
evaluated such quality improvements due to Alar use with an  apple model that measured four benefit 
categories:  increase in storage life;  increase in total supply of fresh apples; reduction in pruning 
costs; and  early bearing of young trees (U.S. EPA, 1985).  Without Alar, a decline was expected in 
the supply of fresh  apples, with a simultaneous increase in the supply of processed apples since fresh 
apples of lower quality would be sold for processing.  Prices for fresh  apples at the farm gate were 
expected to  increase by  approximately 6 %,  and  prices for processing apples to  decrease by  10%  (U. S. 
EPA,  1985).  Retail  prices for fresh apples were expected to increase by $1.00 to  $1.90 per bushel, 
and  the price of processed apple products to  decline but not enough to offset the increase for fresh 
apples (U.S. EPA,  1985).  These price and  quantity effects result in  an estimated reduction in  con-
sumer expenditures of $170 million and  an overall reduction in farmers' profits of $33 million.  The 
EPA's estimate of total social costs from loss of Alar was roughly $60 million, with an upper bound 
of $108 million. 
We rely on the EPA estimate of producer costs and develop estimates of processing and  dis-
tribution costs. I I  We initially assume that producers, processors, and  distributors reacted to  the 
Massachusetts regulation by pursuing a single-product strategy, in effect switching to  an Alar-free 
product to be sold nationwide.  We also assume that all  apple production was  affected, since pro-
ducers wish to maintain the option of selling in the processed as  well  as  fresh  apple markets.  This 
overstates the impact to  the extent that producers continued to use Alar and that decisions to dis-
continue Alar use were based on factors additional to  the Massachusetts regulation.  Estimated costs 
are for  1987. 
lIThe total cost range (SC) of our estimates, $33 to  $126 million, encompasses EPA's overall 
range of $60 to $108 million.  Higher estimates of producer losses have been published (e.g., 
O'Rourke, 1990) but they are for sales losses associated with an  Alar "scare"  not for an orderly end 
of Alar use as  is assumed in the EPA estimates. 
23 Costs to Producers:  The EPA estimated costs to  producers from  loss of Alar at $32.9 mil-
lion.  We allocate this cost to the states based on their 1986 shares of total production as  reported in 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Fruit:  Situation and Outlook Yearbook (1987).12  Overall 
production rather than data on specific varieties of apples  is used based on EPA's finding that Alar 
was applied to almost all  varieties for its broad sphere of action (U.S. EPA, 1985).  Based on total 
costs to  producers of $32.9 million, in-state (Massachusetts) costs from loss of Alar are $555,803 and 
out-state costs are $32,344,197. 13 
Costs to Processors and  Distributors:  Cost estimates for processors and distributors from loss 
of Alar are based on 1987 Census of Manufactures data.  Census data do  not generally list informa-
tion on apple processing at the 7-digit product level for individual states.  Therefore SIC data on total 
U.S. processing volume and  individual state volume in the relevant 5-digit product classes were used 
to  estimate each state's share at the 5-digit level.  These state shares were applied to total U.S. value 
of shipments of heat-processed apple products at the 7-digit level to  yield 7-digit state shares.  Thus 
the 5- and 7-digit state volume shares are assumed to be equal.  The 1987 in-state (Massachusetts) 
processing value of shipments is  calculated at $7.043 million, the out-state at $932.357 million, and 
the total at $939.4 million. 14  No  reliable estimates exist of probable higher costs to processors and 
distributors due to the removal of Alar from  the market.  EPA expected the actual  cost of processing 
12State-by-state shares were not available for  1987. 
13Note this procedure overestimates producer costs from  loss of Alar in growing apples for 
processing because the EPA estimates are for loss of Alar in all  apple production. 
14rhe relevant 7-digit products are listed in footnote 6.  The SIC data did not list a value of 
shipments for SIC 2032111, canned baby foods,  fruits for  1987 because of disclosure problems.  This 
SIC is  not included in the calculations.  For SIC 2032171  canned baby foods, juices the data provide 
an  estimate of $115.5 million for  1982, with data withheld for  1987 due to disclosure problems. 
Inflating this value to  1987 yields a value of shipments of $159.5 million, which  is  an overestimation 
for apple juice.  The value of shipments figures are at wholesale prices.  The 1982 figures suggest 
that, after inflation, the value of shipments in these seven 7-digit SICs in  1987 would have been 
$1,076.46 million.  Actual figures show the 1987 value of shipments to be $939.4 million.  The 
difference presumably reflects lost sales due to  publicity about Alar. 
24 apples to go down with loss of Alar as  more product was diverted to  this market.  Again using a 
single-product strategy, we estimate these costs based on three scenarios:  a 0.1 %,  1.0%, and  10.0% 
increase in costs.  Estimated increased in- and  out-state costs are shown in Table 4.  They range in-
state from a low of $7,000 to a high of $704,000 and  out-state from $932,000 to  $93,000,000.  When 
added to the production costs estimated in the previous section, 3 in-state (rows 4-6, Table 3) and out-
state (rows 7-9, Table 3)  cost estimates are generated.  The federalism criteria can be applied to  the 
estimated benefits and  costs to analyze the federalism dispute arising from  Massachusetts' regulation 
of daminozide residues in heat-processed apple products. 
Table 4. Increased Processing and Distribution Costs (in Dollars) 
Costs  0.1 % Cost Increase  1. 0 % Cost Increase  10.0% Cost Increase 
In-State  7,043  70,430  704,300 
Out-State  932,357  9,323,570  93,235,700 
Total  939,400  9,394,000  93,940,000 
Results of  Applying Federalism Criteria to  Estimated Benefits and Costs 
A range of estimated benefits and  costs of the Massachusetts daminozide residue standard 
given an  industry-wide single-product strategy are shown in Table 3.  Here each of the willingness to 
pay values is  combined with the possible cost increases to generate a further range of benefit, cost, 
and benefit/cost ratios to be used in applying the federalism criteria.  These ratios are shown in Table 
5.  We discuss each of the spillover criteria in turn. 
Criterion 1:  No Spillover.  Criterion 1 requires that all  effects of the state regulation be in-
state, judging the validity of the stricter Massachusetts residue standard on whether the out-state 
effects are zero.  The benefit and cost calculations indicate that Criterion 1 does not hold for this state 
regulation (see rows 2, 7,  8 and  9, Table 3).  For example,  a willingness to  pay of $1.76 and  a 1  % 
25 Table 5.  Summary of Estimated Benefit and  Cost Ratios 
Row  Benefit &  Cost Measures  $0.33d  $0.81 b 
1  SB,/SB  0.024  0.024 
2  S~/SB  0.976  0.976 
3  SC,/SC  (O.l%)C  0.017  0.017 
4  SC,/SC  (0.1 %)d  0.015  0.015 
5  SC,/SC  (1O.0%)e  0.010  0.010 
6  S~/SC (0.1 %)  0.983  0.983 
7  S~/SC (1.0%)  0.985  0.985 
8  S~/SC (10.0%)  0.990  0.990 
9  SB/SC  (0.1 %)  2.368  5.811 
10  SB/SC  (1.0%)  1.894  4.650 
11  SB/SC  (10.0%)  0.632  1.550 
12  SB,/SC,  (0.1 %)  3.433  8.426 
13  SB,/SC,  (1.0%)  3.085  7.573 
14  SB,/SC,  (10.0%)  1.533  3.764 
15  S~/S~ (0.1 %)  2.350  5.767 
16  S~/S~ (1.0%)  1.876  4.606 
17  S~/S~ (10.0%)  0.623  1.528 
dPisher et a1.  based estimates of will ingness to pay. 
bVan Ravenswaay and  Hoehn based estimate of willingness to pay. 
C Estimate for a 0.1 % cost increase. 
dEstimate for a 1.0%  cost increase. 
eEstimate for a 10.0% cost increase. 
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$1.76d  $2.32d  $12.32d 
0.024  0.024  0.024 
0.976  0.976  0.976 
0.017  0.017  0.017 
0.015  0.015  0.015 
0.010  0.010  0.010 
0.983  0.983  0.983 
0.985  0.985  0.985 
0.990  0.990  0.990 
12.627  16.645  88.388 
10.103  13.317  70.720 
3.369  4.441  23.581 
18.308  24.134  128.159 
16.455  21.691  115.187 
8.178  10.780  57.244 
12.531  16.518  87.716 
10.007  13.191  70.051 
3.320  4.377  23.243 cost increase result in  S~  of $417 million and  S~  of $42 million.  Under this criterion, the Massa-
chusetts action should be invalidated by the courts or preempted by federal  law. 
Criterion 2:  Maximum Absolute Size.  Criterion 2 limits the absolute size of the spillovers to 
a specified value G.  For the Massachusetts regulation, if the G value for spillover benefits were set 
at $78 million or less, the criterion would suggest invalidation or preemption is  in order since S~  is 
greater than this value for all  Willingness to  pay scenarios (row 2, Table 3).  Similarly, if the G value 
for spillover costs were set at $33  million or less the criterion would suggest the law should not 
stand.  Depending on the willingness to  pay and  cost scenarios used, the regulation generated sizable 
out-state benefits and  costs making it unlikely it would be judged appropriate under Criterion 2. 
Criterion 3:  Net Positive Spillover.  This criterion requires out-state benefits to  be greater 
than out-state costs,  S~  >  S~.  Another way of stating Criterion 3 is that the out-state benefit/cost 
ratio  (S~/S~  should be greater than one.  This is the case except for the combination of a willing-
ness to  pay of $0.33 and  a cost increase of 10%  (rows  15-17, Table 5), where S~/S~  is only 0.623. 
Therefore almost all  scenarios of the Massachusetts regulation meet criterion 3, suggesting that the 
courts and  Congress should not interfere with the state's activity. 
Criterion 4:  No  Net Negative Spillover.  Criterion 4 requires no  net negative spillover.  It 
can be stated as  the requirement that the out-state benefit/cost ratio  (S~/S~)  be greater than or equal 
to one.  As found under Criterion 3, this condition holds for every scenario except the lowest willing-
ness to pay of $0.33 and a 10%  cost increase.  Like Criterion 3, Criterion 4 suggests the state regula-
tory activity should not be blocked. 
Criterion 5:  Equal Spillover.  Criterion 5 argues that state regulation is valid only where 
there is  equal spillover of benefits and  costs.  As  expected, given the strict equality requirement, none 
of the five formulas  (see Table 2) for Criterion 5 hold for the Massachusetts regulation (compare row 
1 with rows 3-5; row 2 with rows 6-8; rows  12-14 with rows 9-11; rows  15-17 with rows 9-11 ; and 
rows  12-14 with rows 15-16, Table 5).  This is the case for all  levels of willingness to  pay and  cost 
27 increases.  Thus Criterion 5 is  not met by  the Massachusetts regulation of daminozide residues, sug-
gesting under this criterion that invalidation or preemption is  appropriate. 
Criterion 6:  No  Disproportionate Spillover.  Under Criterion 6 a state regulation is deemed 
appropriate if there is no  disproportionate spillover, with the acceptable disproportionality defined by 
the policy maker through specification of H values.  Criterion 6 involves the same row comparisons 
as  Criterion 5, with the adjustment of addition (or subtraction) of an H value.  The comparisons are 
in two groups.  The first involves analysis of benefit and  cost shares.  Comparison of SB1/SB  (row 1, 
Table 5) with SC1/SC (rows 3-5) indicates that the in-state share of the regulation'S total benefits 
(2.4%) is reasonably close to  the in-state share of total costs (1.0-1.7%), implying an H value of .007 
to .014 (0.7-1.4%).  Similarly, comparison of S~/SB (97.6%) to  S~/SC (98.3%-99.0%), shows a 
reasonably close match again implying an H value of .007 to  .014 (0.7-1.4%).  This set of compari-
sons suggests that under Criterion 6, the Massachusetts regulation would likely be deemed appropriate 
and not a candidate for invalidation or preemption. 
The second  group compares benefit/cost ratios with three different formulas.  Comparisons of 
in- and out-state benefit/cost ratios to  the total ratio (rows 12-14 to  rows 9-11  and  rows 15-17 to rows 
9-11 , respectively) shows that the in-state ratio is greater than the total ratio by 45 to  142 %, while the 
out-state ratio is  slightly smaller (by about 1  %)  than the overall ratio (out-state and total ratios match 
closely because out-state impacts are such a dominant share of all  effects).  In-state benefit/cost ratios 
are 46 to  146% greater than out-state ratios (rows  12-14 versus rows 15-17), a gap that may well be 
considered  large depending on the policy maker's viewpoint. 
The two groups of comparisons show that although in- and out-state shares of benefits and 
costs are closely comparable, in- and out-state benefit/cost ratios are not closely matched.  The fact 
that  in-state ratios are considerably more favorable than those out-state would likely mean that the 
Massachusetts regulation would be judged inappropriate under Criterion 6. 
Criterion 7:  Maximum Spillover Share.  Criterion 7 requires the out-state shares of total 
benefits and  costs to be less than  a specified value K.  For the Massachusetts regulation, the out-state 
28 share of total benefits is 97.6% (row 2, Table 5), while the out-state share of total  costs is 98-99% 
(rows 6-8, Table 5).  Thus under Criterion 7 if K is specified at anything less than 97%  the state 
regulation would be judged inappropriate and  be subject to  invalidation or preemption. 
Settling the Dispute.  Assuming a single-product scenario and  for a wide range of benefit and 
cost estimations, the seven criteria give clear answers to the question whether the Massachusetts regu-
lation of daminozide residues in heat-processed apple products is  appropriate,  although the answers 
vary with the criteria.  Criteria 1,  2, 5, 6, and  7 suggest that, for this particular state action, court 
invalidation or preemption by federal law is  appropriate.  The main cause of this conclusion is that 
under a single-product scenario a very large share of the regulation's impacts occurs out-state.  A 
secondary cause is that the in-state benefit/cost ratio exceeds the out-state ratio because costs are 
disproportionately felt out-state.  Earlier we concluded that a combination of Criteria 2, 6, and  7 
yields the most useful basis for judging the appropriateness of a state regulation, given a spillover 
basis of judgement.  Under this criteria set, the Massachusetts regulation would be deemed  inappro-
priate and  recommended for invalidation under court review or preemption by federal  law. 
Under Criterion 3 and the more generally stated Criterion 4, the Massachusetts regulation 
would be deemed appropriate since it results in  a net positive spillover under nearly all  benefit and 
cost scenarios.  Use of Criterion 4 to judge state regulations may be desirable if the goal is to give 
states maximum latitude in experimenting with regulations.  However, Criterion 4 does not provide a 
symmetrical test since it allows large positive spillovers but disallows negative spillovers of any size. 
The above analysis assumes that, in response to the Massachusetts regulation of daminozide 
residues in heat-processed apple products, producers and processors adopted a strategy of producing a 
single, Alar-free product for national sale.  This overestimates the impact of the regulation to  the 
extent they instead adopted a dual-product strategy, producing one product for Massachusetts and 
another for the rest of the country.  However, assuming a dual-product strategy does not alter our 
conclusions unless the segregation of in- and  out-state product is complete and  all  the costs of the dual 
29 system are borne by  in-state consumers.  If spillover adoption occurs, even on the order of only 10% 
of out-state product meeting Massachusetts standards, Criteria 2, 6, and 7 still suggest the state law 
should be invalidated or preempted, while Criterion 4 suggests it is appropriate.  Thus even though 
this particular regulation has an overall benefit/cost ratio that is generally well above 1, we conclude 
under our "best" set of economic criteria that regulation of daminozide residues in heat-processed 
apple products is not an  appropriate subject for state action. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Federalism disputes arising from  state regulation, particularly regulations pursuing health, 
safety, and  environmental goals, are a common feature of the U.S. political system.  Legal and eco-
nomic discussions of bases for settling such disputes often focus on the in- and out-state incidence of 
the state regulation's benefits and  costs.  However, incidence is  a complex concept, which the liter-
ature to  date has not systematically analyzed, resulting in  a fuzziness in thinking about federalism 
disputes.  We discuss five factors  important to  evaluating incidence and present spillover criteria 
based on these factors for judging federalism disputes.  No  single criterion captures the important 
factors suggesting use of a small set of criteria that addresses the absolute size of spillovers, the 
proportionality between spillover benefits and costs, and the share of spillover to total benefits and 
costs.  We note that this criteria set constitutes a fairly stringent standard for judging state regulations. 
Applying the criteria to a Massachusetts regulation of daminozide residues in heat-processed 
apple products shows that the criteria reach different conclusions on the appropriateness of the state 
regulation.  Given our benefit and cost estimates, the main economic criteria set suggests the Massa-
chu  etts regulation should be invalidated by the courts or preempted by federal  law based on its 
spillovers of benefits and costs.  However, other criteria suggest the law is appropriate because net 
spillovers were positive.  The application illustrates how use of the spillover criteria can clarify 
analysis of federalism disputes arising from state regulations. 
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